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Most scientific models are not physical objects, and this raises important questions. What 
sort of entity are models, what is truth in a model, and how do we learn about models? In 
this paper I argue that models share important aspects in common with literary fiction, and 
that therefore theories of fiction can be brought to bear on these questions. In particular, I 
argue that the pretence theory as developed by Walton (1990) has the resources to answer 
these questions. I introduce this account, outline the answers that it offers, and develop a 
general picture of scientific modelling based on it.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The first step in tackling a scientific problem often is to come up with a suitable model. When 
studying the orbit of a planet we take both the planet and the sun to be spinning perfect 
spheres with homogenous mass distributions gravitationally interacting with each other but 
nothing else in the universe; when investigating the population of fish in the Adriatic Sea we 
assume that all fish are either predators or prey and that these two groups interact with each 
other according to a simple law; and when studying the exchange of goods in an economy we 
consider a situation in which there are only two goods, two perfectly rational agents, no 
restrictions on available information, no transaction costs, no money, and dealings are done in 
no time.1 In other words, what we are presented with is a highly stylised and distorted 
rendering of the system under investigation. A popular introduction to physics describes the 
situation as follows:  
                                                 
1
 The first of these is the Newtonian model the solar system that is discussed in most elementary physics 
textbooks (see e.g. Young and Freedman 2000). The is second the so-called ‘Lotka-Volterra model’ (Volterra 
1926); see Weisberg (2007) for a discussion. The third is what is now called the ‘Edgeworth Box’ (Edgeworth 
1881); see Morgan (2004) for a discussion.  
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‘In physics a model is a simplified version of a physical system that would be too complicated to 
study in detail. […] Suppose we want to analyze the motion of a baseball thrown through the air. How 
complicated is this problem? The ball is neither perfectly spherical nor perfectly rigid; it has raised 
seams, and it spins as it moves through the air. Wind and air resistance influence the motion, the earth 
rotates beneath it, the ball’s weight varies a little as its distance from the earth changes, and so on. If 
we try to include all these things, the analysis gets hopelessly complicated. Instead, we invent a 
simplified version of the problem. We neglect the size and shape of the ball by representing it as a 
point object, or particle. We neglect air resistance by making the ball move in the vacuum, we forget 
about the earth’s rotation, and we make the weight a constant. Now we have a problem that is simple 
enough to deal with.’ (2000, 3) 
 
And this point is not specific to physics; the same can be said about modelling in important 
parts of biology, chemistry, economics, psychology, and other disciplines.  
 
When presenting a model, scientists perform two different acts: they present a hypothetical 
system as object of study, and they claim that this system is a representation of the particular 
part or aspect of the world that we are interested in, the so-called the target system.2 In 
working scientists’ presentations of models these two acts are usually not clearly 
distinguished, and the emphasis is often on the first act rather than on the specification of the 
representational relation. Nevertheless, from an analytical perspective it is important to keep 
these two acts separate. To this end, let us introduce some terminology. I refer to the 
hypothetical system proffered as an object of study as the ‘model system’. Model systems can 
be (and often are) used to represent a target system, but the intrinsic nature of the model 
system does not depend on whether or not this is the case; model systems are objects of sorts 
and as such can be studied in themselves. Furthermore, I use the term ‘modelling’ to refer to 
the entire practice of devising, describing and using a model system.  
 
This raises two sets of questions. The first is concerned with the nature of model systems. 
What kind of things are they? What makes statements about them true or false? And how do 
we learn about them? The second is concerned with how model systems represent their 
targets. What relation does the model have to bear to the target and what is the role of 
conscious users when a model system is used to represent something? This paper is concerned 
with the first set of questions. It puts forward the claim that scientific modelling shares 
important aspects in common with literary fiction and develops a view of model systems 
                                                 
2
 This point has been emphasised by Godfrey-Smith (2006) and Weisberg (2007).  
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based on the so-called pretence theory of fiction. This choice should not suggest that the 
second group of questions is either straightforward or unimportant. On the contrary, it is far 
from clear how to analyse representation and much will have to be said about this problem at 
some later point. This paper paves the ground for such a discussion because the issue of 
scientific representation can be addressed properly only once we understand the nature of 
model systems. 
 
 
2. Strictures on Structures 
 
What kind of things are model systems? Some, for instance wood models of a car that we put 
into a wind tunnel, are physical objects. But most models, among them those mentioned in the 
introduction, are not. An influential view, originating with Suppes (1960) and now held, 
among others, by van Fraassen (1997) and French and Ladyman (1997), takes model systems 
to be structures (in the set-theoretical sense). A structure S = [U, R] consists of a non-empty 
set U of objects (the domain of the structure), and a non-empty indexed set R of relations on 
U. This definition does not assume anything about the nature of the objects in U. Likewise, 
relations are defined purely extensionally (i.e. an n-place relation is defined as a class of 
ordered n-tuples), and hence have no properties other than formal properties such as 
transitivity or reflexivity.3 
 
This conception of model systems is too narrow. Although structures do play an important 
role in scientific modelling (I come back to this below), model systems cannot be identified 
with structures. What is missing in the structuralist conception is an analysis of the physical 
character of model systems. The view of model systems that I advocate regards them as 
imagined physical systems, i.e. as hypothetical entities that, as a matter of fact, do not exist 
spatio-temporally but are nevertheless not purely mathematical or structural in that they 
would be physical things if they were real.4 If the Newtonian model system of sun and earth 
were real, it would consist of two spherical bodies with mass and other concrete properties 
such as hardness and colour, properties that structures do not have; likewise, the populations 
in the Lotka-Volterra model would consist of flesh-and-blood animals if they were real, and 
the agents in Edgeworth’s economic model would be rational human beings.  
                                                 
3
 Russell (1919, 60) presents a clear account of this aspect of structures. 
4
 This view of models is advocated by Frigg (2003) and Godfrey-Smith (2006). 
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There are two reasons to prefer this take on model systems over the structuralist account. The 
first is that scientists often talk about model systems as if they were physical things, which is 
a natural thing to do if models are imagined physical entities. Young and Freedman, when 
presenting their model of the baseball (in the above quote), do not say that they present a 
mathematical structure; rather they describe a hypothetical situation in which a perfectly 
spherical rigid ball moves without air resistance and in the absence of other confounding 
factors. This way of thinking about model systems is typical in mechanics as well as many 
branches of physics. And the same is true in biology. Godfrey-Smith (2006, 736-8) points out 
that Levins’ work on population biology as well as Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s models 
in evolutionary theory are best understood as describing hypothetical physical populations, 
and he adds that this way of looking at model systems is crucial for the discovery of novel 
phenomena, for making sense of the treatment of certain issues (e.g. the discussion of 
robustness in Levins), and for the communication of results in papers and books.  
 
The second reason has to do with how model systems relate to the world. A structure is not 
about anything in the world, let alone about a particular target system. Those who take model 
systems to be structures suggest connecting structures to target systems by setting up a 
morphism between them (the most common morphism is isomorphism; other suggestions 
include partial isomorphism, homomorphism, and embedding). But a morphism holds 
between two structures and not between a structure and a part of the world per se. In order to 
make sense of the notion that there is a morphism between a model system and its target we 
have to assume that the target exemplifies a particular structure, and this cannot be had 
without bringing non-structural features into play.  
 
The argument for this latter claim proceeds in two steps. The first consists in realising that 
structural claims are abstract in the sense that they cannot be true unless some more concrete 
claims are true as well.5 This is best illustrated with an example. Consider St = [U=(a, b, c), 
R=(〈a, b〉, 〈b, c〉, 〈a, c〉)],  the structure consisting of a three-object domain endowed with a 
transitive relation R (where ‘〈 , 〉’ denotes an ordered tuple). The claim that a part of the 
physical world has structure St is true only if it is also true that it consists of three iron rods of 
different length (in which case a, b, and c are the iron rods and R the shorter than relation), or 
if it is also true that it consists of three not equally expensive books (in which case a, b, and c 
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 This point is discussed in more detail in Frigg (2006).  
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are the books and R the more expensive than relation), etc. There are innumerable descriptions 
that make the structural claim that a part of the physical world exemplifies St true, but the 
claim is never true unless some non-structural claim is true as well.6 
 
Hence, in order for it to be true that a target system possesses a particular structure, a more 
concrete description must be true of the system as well. This by itself would not have to worry 
the structuralist. The problem, and this is the second step, arises when we realise that the 
descriptions we choose to ground structural claims are almost never true descriptions of the 
target system. The examples mentioned in the introduction make this sufficiently clear. The 
structure on which the formal treatment of solar system is based is not fitted out by a realistic 
description of the solar system, but by one that takes planets to be ideal spheres with 
homogenous mass distributions, etc. This is what Downes has in mind when he says that there 
is no empirical system corresponding to the equation of the ideal pendulum (1992, 145), and 
what Cartwright (1983, Ch. 7) emphasises when she points out that we have to come up with 
a ‘prepared description’ of the system in order to make it amenable to mathematical treatment.  
 
Taken literally, descriptions that ground structural claims (almost always) fail to be 
descriptions of the intended target system. Instead, they describe a hypothetical system 
distinct from the target system. This has unfortunate consequences for the structuralist. If the 
descriptions employed to attribute a structure to a target system were just plain descriptions of 
that system, then the claim that model systems are just structures would appear at least prima 
facie plausible. But once we acknowledge that these descriptions describe hypothetical 
systems rather than real target systems, we also have to acknowledge that hypothetical 
systems are an important part of the theoretical apparatus we employ, and that they therefore 
have to be included in our analysis of how scientific modelling works. This can, of course, be 
done in different ways. My suggestion is that these hypothetical systems in fact are the 
models systems we try to understand, and I therefore I reserve the term ‘model system’ for the 
hypothetical physical entities described by the descriptions we use to ground structural 
claims; I refer to the relevant structures as ‘model structures’. This facilitates the analysis in 
what follows, but ultimately nothing hangs on this choice; one could just as well say that 
                                                 
6
 One might try to avoid this problem by positing that models represent data (or data models) rather than target 
systems. This seems to be wrong. Data play an important role in confirming a model, but they are not what the 
model represents. For a discussion of this point see Bogen and Woodward (1988) and Teller (2001). 
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model systems are a composite entities consisting of a hypothetical system and a structural 
part. What does matter, however, is that we acknowledge that scientific modelling indeed 
involves such hypothetical systems.7 
 
 
3. Model Systems and Fiction 
 
The question regarding the nature of model systems is reminiscent of another time-honoured 
philosophical problem, the nature of fiction. Although hardly at the centre of attention, the 
parallel between certain aspects of science and literary fiction has not gone unnoticed. It has 
been mentioned by Maxwell (see Cat (2001) for a discussion), and occupied centre stage in 
Vaihinger’s (1911) philosophy of the ‘as if’. In more recent years, the parallel has also been 
drawn specifically between models and fiction. Cartwright observes that ‘a model is a work of 
fiction’ (1983, 153) or an ‘intellectual construction’ (ibid, 144), which motivates her move to 
view physics as theatre (ibid., 139) and to later suggest an analysis of models as fables (1999, 
Ch. 2). Fine notes that modelling natural phenomena in every area of science involves fictions 
(1993, 16), and Elgin (1996, Ch. 6) argues that science shares important epistemic practices 
with artistic fiction. Hartmann (1999) and Morgan (2001) emphasise that stories and 
narratives play an important role in models, and Morgan (2004) stresses the importance of 
imagination in model building. Sugden (2000) points out that economic models describe 
‘counterfactual worlds’ that are constructed by the modeller, and McCloskey (1990) regards 
economists as ‘tellers of stories and makers of poems’.8 Finally, in a recent paper Godfrey-
Smith has explicitly put forward the view that models are similar to the fictional entities we 
encounter in novels:  
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 One could try to avoid the commitment to hypothetical systems by renouncing a literal understanding of the 
relevant descriptions and arguing that it does not follow from the fact that descriptions are poor or highly 
idealised that they are not descriptions of the target at all; it just means that they are idealised descriptions. This 
move is of no avail. Being an idealised description is not primitive concept and it calls for analysis. On the most 
plausible analysis, D is an approximate description of object O iff what D literally describes is in some relevant 
sense an idealisation of O. But what D literally describes is a hypothetical system, and so we back to where we 
started. 
8
 Giere (1988, Ch. 3) argues that models are ‘abstract entities’, which could be also interpreted as a fiction based 
view of models. In personal communication he pointed out to me that this is not what he intended.  
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‘In making this argument, I take at face value the fact that modelers often take themselves to be 
describing imaginary biological populations, imaginary neural networks, or imaginary economies. […] 
Although these imagined entities are puzzling, I suggest that at least much of the time they might be 
treated as similar to something that we are all familiar with, the imagined objects of literary fiction. Here I 
have in mind entities like Sherlock Holmes’ London, and Tolkein’s Middle Earth. These are imaginary 
things that we can, somehow, talk about in a fairly constrained and often communal way. On the view I 
am developing, the model systems of science often work similarly to these familiar fictions. The model 
systems of science will often be described in mathematical terms (we could do the same to Middle Earth), 
but they are not just mathematical objects.’ (Godfrey-Smith 2006, 735) 
 
I support a point of view that aims to understand model systems in analogy with entities that 
occur in literary fiction. What we have to recognise, though, is that this analogy is only a 
starting point. If put forward without further qualifications, explaining model systems in terms 
of fictional characters amounts to explaining the unclear by the obscure. And Godfrey-Smith 
agrees. In the paragraph immediately following the above passage he observes that ‘[a]t the 
end of the day, of course, some general account must be given of the imaginary objects of 
both ordinary fiction and scientific modeling’. To present such an account is the aim of this 
paper.  
 
Before delving into theories of fiction, more needs to be said about the questions we expect an 
account of scientific models to answer, and about why the analogy between model systems 
and fictions is fruitful.  
 
Every tenable account of model systems has to address the following issues.  
 
(I1) Identity conditions. Model systems are often presented by different authors in different 
ways. Nevertheless, many different descriptions are meant to describe the same model system. 
When are the model systems specified by different descriptions identical?  
 
(I2) Attribution of properties. In the previous sections I have argued that model systems have 
physical properties. How is this possible if model systems do not exist in space and time? 
What sense can we make of statements like ‘the ball is charged’ or ‘the population is isolated 
from its environment’ if there are no actual balls and populations? In fact, it has been claimed 
that such statements are outright contradictory because abstract objects like the ideal 
pendulum cannot have the same properties as concrete physical systems (Hughes 1997, 330).  
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(I3) Comparative statements. Comparing a model and its target system is essential to many 
aspects of modelling. We customarily say things like ‘real agents do not behave like the 
agents in the model’ and ‘the surface of the real sun is unlike the surface of the model sun’. 
How can we compare something that does not exist with something that does? Likewise, how 
are we to analyse statements that compare features of two model systems with each other like 
‘the agents in the first model are more rational than the agents in the second model’?  
 
(I4) Truth in model systems. There is right and wrong in a discourse about model systems. But 
on what basis are claims about a model system qualified as true or false, in particular if the 
claims concern issues about which the description of the system remains silent? What we 
need is an account of truth in model systems, which, first, explains what it means for a claim 
about a model system to be true or false and which, second, draws the line between true and 
false statements at the right place (for instance, an account on which all statements about a 
model systems come out false would be unacceptable).  
 
(I5) Epistemology. We do investigate model systems and find out about them; truths about the 
model system are not forever concealed from us. How do we find out about these truths and 
how do we justify our claims?  
 
(I6) Metaphysical commitments. The metaphysics of fictional entities is an issue fraught with 
controversy (see Friend (2007) for a review). For this reason we need to know what kind of 
commitments we incur when we understand model systems along the lines of fiction, and how 
these commitments, if any, can be justified.  
 
It is the contention of this paper that the pretence theory of fiction fits the bill.9 The next 
section provides a brief introduction to this theory, and Section 5 outlines the responses that 
we get from this theory (I1) – (I6).10  
                                                 
9
 Strictly speaking, Walton (1990) restricts the use of ‘pretence’ to verbal (or more generally behavioural) 
participation, which does not include the activity of someone reading on his own. However, it has become 
customary to use ‘pretence’ as synonymous with ‘make-believe’ and I stick to this wider use in what follows. 
10
 For want of space I cannot discuss competing approaches. In a nutshell, their problems seem to be the 
following. The paraphrase account (Russell 1905) does not offer a workable theory of truth in fiction (Crittenden 
1991, Ch. 1). The neo-Meinongean view (Parsons 1980) runs into difficulties with incompleteness (Howell 
1979, Sec. 1) and as a consequence does not offer a satisfactory answer to (I5). Finally, Lewis’ (1978) account is 
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Before delving into a discussion of fiction, let me give reasons for believing that thinking 
about model systems as akin to the objects of literary fiction helps us answering these 
questions. First, characteristically there is nothing in the world of which essential passages of 
the text of a novel are a true description, and the names of fictional persons and objects 
characteristically do not denote real persons or objects. Competent readers are fully aware of 
this and do not mistakenly believe that they read a description of fact when they engage with 
the text. The situation is the same in science. As Thomson-Jones (2007) points out, scientific 
textbooks and journal articles abound with passages that are meaningful plain descriptions of 
physical systems from the domain of enquiry of the scientific discipline in question, but which 
do not describe actual systems and which would not be taken to do so by any competent 
practitioner in the field. Frictionless planes, spherical planets, infinitely extended condenser 
plates, infinitely high potential wells, massless strings, populations living in isolation from 
their environment, animals reproducing at constant rate, perfectly rational agents, markets 
without transaction costs, and immediate adjustment to shocks are but some objects or 
features that figure prominently in many model systems and yet fail to have counterparts in 
the real world. 
 
Second, we can truly say that in David Lodge’s ‘Changing Places’ Morris Zapp is a professor 
of English literature at the State University of Euphoria. We can also truly say that in the 
novel he has a heart and a liver, but we cannot truly say that he is a ballet dancer or a violin 
player. Only the first of these claims is part of the explicit content of the novel, yet there is a 
matter of the fact about what is the case ‘in the world of the story’ even when claims go 
beyond what is explicitly stated. The situation with model systems is the same. The 
description of a model system only specifies a handful of essential properties, but it is 
understood that the system has properties other than the ones mentioned in the description. 
Model systems are interesting exactly because more is the true of them than what the initial 
description specifies; no one would spend time studying model systems if all there was to 
know about them was the explicit content of the initial description. It is true that the 
Newtonian model solar system is stable and that the planets move in elliptical orbits, but none 
of this is part of the explicit content of the model system’s original specification.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
too permissive about what counts as true in a fictional context (Currie 1990, Sec. 2.3; Lamarque and Olsen 1994, 
Ch. 4). 
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Third, a story not only has content that goes beyond what is explicitly stated, we also have the 
means to learn about this ‘extra content’ by using certain (usually implicit) rules of inference. 
The same goes for model systems. Finding out what is true in a model system beyond what is 
explicitly specified in the relevant description is a crucial aspect of our engagement with the 
system – in fact the bulk of the work that is done with a model system is usually expended on 
establishing whether or not certain claims about it hold true.  
 
Fourth, although we sometimes read just for pleasure, when we read serious literature we 
often engage in comparisons between situations in the fiction and real circumstances, and in 
doing so we learn about the world.11 Again, this has parallels in the context of modelling. At 
what point exactly comparisons between model system and target become relevant depends 
on one’s theory of representation; but on every account of representation one has to compare 
features of the model system with features of the target at some point, even if only to assess 
how good an approximation the former is of the latter.  
 
 
4. A Primer on Pretence Theory 
 
Kendall Walton’s (1990) point of departure is the capacity of humans to imagine things.12 
Sometimes we imagine something without a particular reason. But there are cases in which 
our imagining something is prompted by the presence of a particular object, in which case this 
object is referred to as a ‘prop’. ‘Object’ has to be understood in the widest sense possible; 
anything capable of affecting our senses can serve as a prop. An object becomes a prop due to 
the imposition of a rule or ‘principle of generation’ (p. 38), prescribing what is to be imagined 
as a function of the presence of the object. If someone imagines something because he is 
encouraged to do so by the presence of a prop he is engaged in a game of make-believe. 
Someone who is involved in a game of make-believe is pretending; so ‘pretence’ is just a 
shorthand way of describing participation in such a game (p. 391) and has (in this context) 
nothing to do with deception (p. 392). The simplest examples of games of make-believe are 
children’s plays (p. 11). In one such play stumps may be regarded as bears and a rope put 
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 There is, however, controversy over how and what we learn from fiction; see Kivy (2006) for a discussion.  
12
 I here discuss pretence theory as it is presented by Walton (1990); Currie (1990) and Evans (1982, Ch. 10) 
develop different versions. Parenthetical references in the text of this and the following section are to Walton’s 
book.  
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around the stump may mean that the bear has been lassoed; or pointing the index finger at 
someone and saying ‘bang’ may mean that the person has been shot.  
 
Pretence theory considers a vast variety of different props ranging from novels to movies, 
from paintings to plays, and from music to children’s games. In the present context I only 
discuss the case of literature. Works of literary fiction are, on the current account, regarded as 
props as they prompt the reader to imagine certain things. By doing so a fiction generates its 
own game of make-believe. This game can be played by a single player when reading the 
work, or by a group when someone tells the story to the others.  
 
Some rules of generation are ad hoc, for instance when a group of children spontaneously 
imposes the rule that stumps are bears and play the game ‘catch the bear’. Other rules are 
publicly agreed on and hence (at least relatively) relatively stable. Games based on public 
rules are ‘authorized’; games involving ad hoc rules are ‘unauthorized’. By definition, a prop 
is a representation if it is a prop in an authorised game. On this view, then, stumps are not 
representations of bears because the rule to regard stumps as bears is an ad hoc rule; Hamlet is 
a representation because everybody who understands English is invited to imagine its content, 
and this has been so since the work came into existence. Within pretence theory 
‘representation’ is used as a technical term. Representations are not, as is customary, 
explained in terms of their relation (e.g. resemblance or denotation) to something beyond 
themselves; representations are things that possess the social function of serving as props in 
authorised games of make-believe. 
 
Props generate fictional truths by virtue of their features and principles of generation. 
Fictional truths can be generated directly or indirectly; directly generated truths are ‘primary’ 
and indirectly generated truths are ‘implied’ (p. 140). Derivatively, one can call the principles 
of generation responsible for the generation of primary truths ‘principles of direct generation’ 
and those responsible for implied truths ‘principles of indirect generation’. The leading idea is 
that primary truths follow immediately from the prop, while implied ones result from the 
application of some rules of inference. The reader of Changing Places reads that Zapp 
‘embarked […] on an ambitious critical project: a series of commentaries on Jane Austen 
which would work through the whole canon, one novel at a time, saying absolutely everything 
that could possibly be said about them’ and is thereby invited to imagine the direct truth that 
Morris Zapp is working on such a project. The reader is also invited to imagine that Zapp is 
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overconfident, arrogant in an amusing way, and pursues a project that is impossible to 
complete. None of this is explicitly stated in the novel. These are inferred truths, which the 
reader deduces from common knowledge about academic projects and the psyche of people 
pursuing them.13 What rules can legitimately be used to reach conclusions of this sort is a 
difficult issue fraught with controversy. I will return briefly to it below; for the time being all 
that matters is that there are such rules, no matter what they are.  
 
One further issue deserves brief mention, the question of what distinguishes a fictional text 
from texts of other sorts. A common view associates fiction with falsity and lack of reference: 
a fictional text is one that talks about persons who don’t exist and events that have never 
occurred. Although it often is the case that fictions are literally false (a fact that I have used in 
previous sections to motivate the view under discussion), it is important to recognise that a 
fictional text cannot be defined in terms of contrast to truth or fact. A news report can be 
wrong, but this does not turn it into fiction; and a novel can refer to real persons and talk 
about actual events without thereby becoming historical treatise (it can do so either by pure 
chance, or because the author intends this to be the case). On the current account, to be a text 
of fiction is to possess the function to serve as a prop in a game of make-believe (p. 102).14 
Hence, the essential difference between a fictional and non-fictional text lies in what we are 
supposed to do with it: a text of fiction invites us to imagine certain things while a report of 
fact leads us to believe what it says. We can imagine both what is and what is not the case and 
hence fictional truth is compatible, and may in fact coincide, with actual truth; but this does 
not render a fictional text non-fictional, just as the fact that a news report is a lie does not turn 
it into fiction.  
 
 
5. Models and Imagination  
 
Pretence theory, with some minor qualifications, has the resources to respond to the issues 
discussed in Section 3. Model systems usually are presented to us by way of descriptions, and 
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 The distinction between primary and inferred truths is not always easy to draw, in particular when dealing with 
complex literary fiction. Walton also guards against simply associating primary truth with what is explicitly 
stated in the text and inferred ones with what follows from them (see Walton (1990, Ch. 4) for a discussion). For 
the purpose of the present discussion these subtleties are inconsequential.  
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 For details see Walton (1990, Ch. 2), Currie (1990, Ch. 1) and Lamarque and Olsen (1994, Chs. 2 and 3).  
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these descriptions should be understood as props in games of make-believe. 
Characteristically, model system descriptions begin with ‘consider’ or ‘assume’ and thereby 
make it clear that they are not descriptions of fact, but an invitation to ponder – in the present 
idiom: imagine – a particular situation. Although it is often understood that this situation is 
such that it does not occur anywhere in reality, this is not a prerequisite; models, like literary 
fictions, are not defined in contrast to truth. In elementary particle physics, for instance, a 
scenario is often proposed simply as a suggestion worth considering and only later, when all 
the details are worked out, the question is asked whether this scenario bears an interesting 
relation to what happens in nature, and if so what the relation is.15 
 
The ‘working out’ of the details usually consists in deriving conclusions from the primary 
assumptions of the model and some general principles or laws that are taken for granted. For 
instance, we derive that the planets move in elliptical orbits from the basic assumptions of the 
Newtonian model and the laws of classical mechanics. This is explained naturally in the idiom 
of pretence theory. What is explicitly stated in a model description (that the model-planets are 
spherical, etc.) are the primary truths of the model, and what follows from them via laws or 
general principles are the implied truths; the principles of direct generation are the linguistic 
conventions that allow us to understand the relevant description, and the principles of indirect 
generation are the laws that are used to derive further results from the primary truths.  
 
We can now address the questions raised in Section 3. The attribution of certain concrete 
properties to models (I2) is explained as it being fictional that the model system possesses 
these properties. To say that the model-population is isolated from its environment is just like 
saying that Zapp drives a convertible. Both claims follow from a prop together with rules of 
generation. In other words, saying that a hypothetical entity possesses certain properties 
involves nothing over and above saying that within a certain game of make-believe we are 
entitled to imagine the entity as having these properties. For this reason there is nothing 
mysterious about ascribing concrete properties to nonexistent entities, nor is it a category 
mistake to do so.  
 
Let us now discuss the issue of truth in model systems (I4), which will also provide us with 
solutions to the other open questions. There is close connection between truth in fiction and 
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 For an accessible account of particle physics that makes this aspect explicit see Smolin (2007), in particular 
Ch. 5 
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truth in a model system, and hence an explication of the former doubles as an explication of 
the latter. So let us start with truth in fiction. The question is: what exactly do we assert when 
we qualify ‘Zapp drives a convertible’ as true in the fiction while ‘Zapp drives a Mini 
Cooper’ as false?16 To begin with, it is crucial to realise that there are three different kinds of 
statement in connection with fiction in science, and that these require a different treatment 
when it comes to the questions of truth; I refer to these as intrafictional, metafictional, and 
transfictional statements.17 For someone sitting in an armchair reading Changing Places 
‘Morris jumped into the paternoster on the downside’ is an intrafictional statement because 
the reader is involved in playing the game defined by the novel and imagines that the 
sentence’s content is the case. Someone who read the novel a while ago and asserts in 
discussion that Zapp jumped into a paternoster makes a metafictional statement because he is 
talking about the fiction. If he then also asserts that Zapp, his quirks notwithstanding, is more 
likeable than any literature teacher he ever had or that Zapp is smarter than Candide, he makes 
transfictional statements as he is comparing Zapp to real persons and characters in other 
fictions. 
 
Intraficational propositions are made within the fiction and we are not meant to believe them, 
nor are we meant to take them as reports of fact; we are meant to imagine them. Although 
some statements are true in the fiction as well as true tout court (‘1968 was the year of student 
revolts’ is true and true in Changing Places), we often qualify false statements as true in the 
fiction (‘Zapp is a literary theorist’ is false because there is no Zapp) and true statements as 
false in the fiction (‘white light is composed of light of other colours’ is false in Goethe’s 
Faust). So truth and truth in fiction are distinct; in fact, truth in fiction is not a species of truth 
at all (p. 41). For this reason it has become customary when talking about what is the case in a 
fiction to replace locutions like ‘true in the fiction’ or ‘true in a fictional world’ by the term of 
art ‘being fictional’; henceforth ‘Fw(p)’ is used as an abbreviation for ‘it is fictional in work w 
                                                 
16
 There is controversy over this issue even within pretence theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
the different proposals and compare them to one another. In what follows I develop an account of truth in fiction 
that is based on elements from different theories and that is tailored towards the needs of a theory of model 
systems. 
17
 All theories of fiction acknowledge this distinction. My terminology is adapted from Currie (1990, Ch. 4) who 
speaks about the ‘fictive’, ‘metafictive’ and ‘transfictive’ use of fictional names.  
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that p’, where p is a placeholder for an intrafictional proposition like ‘Zapp pursues an 
impossible project’.18  
 
The question now becomes: when is p fictional in w? Let the w-game of make-believe be the 
game of make-believe based on work w, and similarly for ‘w-prop’ and ‘w-principles of 
generation’. Then, p is fictional in w iff p is to be imagined in the w-game of make-believe (p. 
39). In more detail:  
 
p is fictional in work w iff the w-prop together with the w-principles of generation 
prescribes p to be imagined 
 
From this it becomes immediately clear how truth and fictionality are connected: p is fictional 
in work w iff Fw(p) is true; the fact that Fw(p) is true is referred to as a ‘fictional truth’ (p. 35). 
For a proposition to be fictional in work w it is not necessary that it is actually imagined by 
anyone: fictional propositions are ones for which there is a prescription to the effect that they 
have to be imagined (p. 39), and whether a proposition is to be imagined is determined by the 
prop and the rules of generation. Hence, props, via the rules of generation, make propositions 
fictional – and thereby create fictional truths – independently of people’s actual imaginings 
(p. 38), and for this reason there can be fictional truths that no one knows of. With this in 
place we can now also render concept of a ‘fictional world’ or ‘world of a fiction’ precise: the 
world of work w is the set of all propositions that are fictional in w.19 
 
This analysis of truth in fiction carries over to model systems one to one simply by replacing 
p by a claim about the model, w by the description of the model system, and w-principles of 
generation by the laws and principles assumed be at work in the model. For instance, ‘the 
solar system is stable’ is true in the Newtonian model of the solar system systems iff the 
description of the system together with the laws and principles assumed to hold in the system 
(the laws of classical mechanics, the law of gravity, and some general assumptions about 
                                                 
18
 I here follow Currie (1990, Ch. 2) and assume that sentences like ‘Zapp drives a convertible’ express 
propositions, something that Walton denies (p. 391). This assumption greatly simplifies the statement of truth 
conditions for fictional statements, but nothing in the present paper hangs on it. Essentially the same results can 
be reached only using sentences and pretence (see pp. 400-105).  
19
 Fictional worlds thus defined are rather different from possible worlds as used in modal logic, the most 
significant difference being that the former are incomplete while the latter are not. See Currie (1990, 53-70) for a 
discussion of possible worlds and fiction.  
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physical objects) imply that this is the case. This gives us a straightforward answer to the 
question about identity conditions (I1). Two models are identical iff the worlds of the two 
models – the set of all propositions that are fictional in the two models – are identical.20 
 
Metaficational propositions make genuine claims that can be true or false in the same way in 
which claims about chairs and tables can be true or false. But how can such statements be true 
if the singular terms that occur in them have no referents? A solution emerges when we 
realise that statements like ‘Zapp is a professor’ are ellipses for ‘in Changing Places, Zapp is 
a professor’. So when we metafictionally assert p, what we really assert is ‘in work w, p’ (p. 
397). Asserting that something is the case in a work of fiction is tantamount to asserting that it 
is fictional in that work. Hence asserting ‘in work w, p’ amounts to asserting ‘p is fictional in 
work w’, which in turn in is equivalent to ‘it is fictional in work w that p’. The last sentence is, 
of course, just Fw(p). Hence metafictionally asserting p amounts to asserting Fw(p). The truth 
condition for this assertion follows from what has been said above:  
 
Fw(p) is true iff p is fictional in w, which in turn is the case iff the w-prop and together 
with the w-principles of generation prescribes p to be imagined.  
 
Derivatively, p, when uttered as a metafictional claim, is true iff p is fictional when uttered as 
an intrafictional claim.21 Again, this analysis translates to scientific statements without further 
ado.  
 
Transfictional propositions pose a particular problem because they – apparently – involve 
comparing something with a nonexistent object, which does not seem to make sense: we 
cannot compare someone with Zapp if there is no Zapp. Different authors have offered very 
different solutions to this problem.22 Fortunately we need not deal with the problem of 
                                                 
20
 An interesting consequence of this identity condition is that not all models with the same prop are identical, 
because they can operate with different rules of indirect generation. This is the case, for instance, when the ‘same 
model’ is treated first classically and then quantum mechanically; on the current view, the classical and the 
quantum model are not identical. 
21
 In some places Walton ties the truth of such statements to authorised games (e.g., p. 397-8). This restriction 
seems unnecessary as the analysis works just as well for unauthorized games.  
22
 Lamarque and Olsen (1994, Ch. 4), for instance, solve the problem by introducing characters. Walton, by 
contrast, renounces the commitment to characters and instead analyses transfictional statements in terms of 
unauthorized games (pp. 405-416). 
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transfictional statements in its full generality because the transfictional statements that are 
relevant in connection with model systems are of a particular kind: they compare features of 
the model systems with features of the target system. For this reason, transfictional statements 
about models should be read as prefixed with a clause stating what the relevant respects of the 
comparison are, and this allows us to rephrase comparative sentences as comparisons between 
properties rather than objects, which makes the original puzzle go away. Hence, truth 
conditions for transfictional statements (in the context of scientific modelling) come down to 
truth conditions for comparative statements between properties, which are unproblematic in 
the current context (that is, the problems that attach to them have nothing to do with issues 
surrounding fictional discourse). For instance, when I say ‘my friend Peter is just like Zapp’ I 
am not comparing my friend to a nonexistent person. What I am asserting is that both my 
Peter and Zapp possess certain relevant properties (Zapp possesses properties in the sense 
explained above) and that these properties are similar in relevant ways. Likewise, when I say 
that the population of rabbits in a certain ecosystem behaves very much like the population in 
the predator-prey model, what I assert is that these populations possess certain relevant 
properties which are similar in relevant respects. What these relevant properties are and what 
counts as being similar in relevant respects may well depend on the context. But this is not a 
problem. All that matters from a semantic point of view is that the apparent comparison with a 
nonexistent object eventually comes down the unproblematic comparison of properties, and 
the statement making this comparison is true iff the statement comparing the properties with 
each other is true. Obviously, statements comparing two nonexistent objects are analysed in 
exactly the same way.  
 
This is the sought after answer to (I3) and (I4). And what is more, this take on truth also 
provides us with an answer to the question about the epistemology of models (I5): we 
investigate a model by finding out what follows from the primary truths of the model and the 
rules of indirect generation. This seems to be both plausible and in line with scientific practice 
because a good deal of the work that scientists do with models can accurately be described as 
studying consequences of the basic assumptions of the model.  
 
What metaphysical commitments do we incur by understanding models in this way? The 
answer is: none. Walton’s theory is antirealist in that it renounces the postulation of fictional 
or abstract entities, and hence a theory of scientific modelling based on this account is also 
free of ontological commitments. This, of course, is not a refutation of metaphysically less 
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parsimonious views such as Meinong’s, and there may be reasons to eventually prefer such a 
view over an antirealist one. The point to emphasise here is that whatever these reasons may 
be, the needs of science are not one among them.  
 
This concludes the discussion of (I1) – (I6). Before integrating the various insights gained so 
far into a consistent picture of scientific modelling, I would like to address a potential 
misunderstanding. In common parlance, ‘imagination’ has subjective overtones, and this 
might suggest to some that an understanding of models as imagined entities makes them 
subjective because every person imagines something different. This is not so. In pretence 
theory, imaginations in an authorised game of make-believe are sanctioned by the prop itself 
and the rules of generation, both of which are public and shared by the relevant community. 
Therefore, someone’s imaginings are governed by intersubjective rules, which guarantee that, 
as long as the rules are respected, everybody involved in the game has the same imaginings. 
For this reason models are indeed the same for everybody.  
 
The framework of pretence theory needs a minor amendment at one particular point to be of 
use for the analysis of scientific modelling. A representation, by definition, is a prop in an 
authorised game of make-believe. On this view, the text of a novel and the description of a 
model system are representations. But in science the term ‘representation’ is also used in a 
different way, namely to denote a relation between the model system and its target (and, 
depending on one’s views about representation, also other relata like users and their 
intentions). These two senses of ‘representation’ need to be clearly distinguished, and for this 
reason I call the former ‘p-representation’ (‘p’ for ‘prop’) and the latter ‘t-representation’ (‘t’ 
for target). Using this idiom, the two acts mentioned in the introduction can be described as, 
first, introducing a p-representation specifying a hypothetical object and, second, claiming 
that this imagined object t-represents the relevant target system.23  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Notice that this distinction also offers a straightforward answer to the alleged puzzle of representations without 
target: these objects are p-represented but not t-represented – a Bacchus picture p-represents Bacchus, but it does 
not (and never can) t-represent him. 
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6. Interlude: The Use of Mathematics 
 
Mathematics plays an important role in scientific modelling, and view of scientific modelling 
is acceptable only if can explain how mathematics comes into the picture. How does the view 
developed so far, which places emphasis on the non-formal character of model systems, 
account for the use of mathematics in modelling? Fortunately this is a variant of a well-known 
and much discussed problem, namely the problem of the applicability of mathematics. Since 
Wigner observed that ‘the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is 
something bordering on the mysterious and that there is no explanation for it’ (1960, 2), a 
sizeable body of literature has grown that is devoted to dispelling the air mystery surrounding 
the use of mathematics in the sciences.24 The main question addressed in this literature is how 
mathematics hooks onto something non-mathematical, and various answers have been given. 
The point to emphasise here is that all these answers carry over to the current context without 
further ado. The problem of how a piece of mathematics latches onto an imagined object is 
the same as the problem of how a piece of mathematics latches onto a part of the material 
world. If we aim to come up with a mathematical description of a population of bees, say, it 
does not matter whether this population is real or imagined. So when asked to explain how 
mathematics enters into the picture of modelling canvassed so far, we can simply appeal to 
whatever account of the application of mathematics we prefer.  
 
In what follows I assume that a structuralist account as outlined in Shapiro (1983) is a 
compelling option (but nothing hinges on this; the points I make in what follows could be 
made from any other point of view). The leading idea of this account is that mathematics is 
the study of abstract structures, and that mathematical expressions like equations should be 
understood as describing structures. If a particular bit of mathematics, e.g. a particular 
equation, applies to a non-mathematical object, this is so because the structure it describes is 
instantiated in that object. Structures themselves are assumed to be Platonic entities in that 
they exist independently of human minds.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 For surveys see Brown (1999, Ch. 4) and Shapiro (1997, Ch. 8).  
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7. The Elements of Scientific Modelling  
 
The elements introduced in the previous sections together add up to a general picture of what 
is involved in scientific modelling. This picture is schematically illustrated in Figure 1.25 An 
immediate reaction to this picture might be to ask: but where is the model? There is no single 
answer to this question. With the exception of the target system, every part of the schema 
legitimately may be, and sometimes is, referred to as ‘model’. Once it is acknowledged that 
scientific modelling involves all the elements that appear in Figure 1, it becomes a purely 
terminological question which one of these we call ‘the model’, and this choice largely 
depends on the context.  
 
 
Figure 1 – The elements of scientific modelling. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Parts of this diagram are motivated by the figure in Giere (1988, 83).  
Model-System Target system 
Text in plain language 
in a book or a paper 
serving as a prop 
T-Representation Model -
structure 
Equations, etc. 
P-Representation 
Application of 
mathematics 
Describes 
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8. Conclusion and Outlook  
 
I have argued that scientific modelling shares important aspects in common with literary 
fiction, and that for this reason theories of fiction can be brought to bear on issues in 
connection with modelling. I have identified six such issues and suggested that pretence 
theory offers satisfactory responses to them. From this discussion emerges a general picture of 
scientific modelling, which views scientific modelling as a complex activity involving the 
elements shown in Figure 1.  
 
Before pointing to some problems and open questions, let me briefly mention a further 
advantage of this view. Although there does not seem to be a clear distinction between 
modelling and thought-experimenting in scientific practice, there has been little interaction 
between the respective philosophical debates. This is lamentable because it seems to be 
important to understand how models and thought experiments relate to each other. In a recent 
paper Davies (2007) argues that there are important parallels between fictional narratives and 
thought experiments, and that exploring these sheds light on many aspects of thought 
experiments. This take on thought experiments is congenial to the view on models presented 
in this paper and suggests an avenue of investigation that understands modelling and thought-
experimenting as intrinsically related.  
 
Needless to say, pretence theory is not without problems.26 Two of them are particularly 
relevant to understanding scientific modelling. The first is that ‘imagination’ has different 
meanings, some of which are unsuited for the purposes of science (see Currie (2004) for a 
discussion of various notions of imagination). Hence, more needs to be said about what 
exactly imagining amounts to in science and about how it differs from imagining in other 
contexts, as well as how it differs from other activities like considering, pondering, and 
entertaining.  
 
The second problem is that although the general idea of rules of generation is intuitively clear, 
it turns out to be difficult to give an account of these rules. The two most important rules in 
the context of literary fiction, the reality principle and the mutual belief principle, not only 
suffer from intrinsic problems (Walton 1990, Ch. 4), it can also be shown that they give 
                                                 
26
 For critical discussion see, among others, Lamarque (1991), Budd (1992), and the contributions to the 
symposium on Walton’s book in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991).  
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wrong results when put to work in science. So what are the rules of generation in scientific 
fictions? This is a substantial question that needs to be addressed, but we should not expect a 
single unified answer. On the contrary, different disciplines have different rules, and 
understanding what these rules are will shed light on how modelling in these disciplines 
works. 
 
Finally, we need to address the second question introduced in Section 1, namely how model 
systems t-represent their respective targets. This is a formidable task. At this point I can only 
indicate that an account based on the notion of exemplification as discussed by Elgin (1996, 
Ch. 6) seems to me to be the most promising route to follow.  
 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
A special thanks goes to the members of the Logos fictionalism reading group, in particular 
Manuel García-Carpintero and José Díez, without whom this paper would not have been 
written. Furthermore I would like to thank Nancy Cartwright, Anjan Chakravartty, Stacie 
Friend, Ron Giere, Arnon Levy, Genoveva Martí, Margaret Moore, Isabelle Peschard, Julian 
Reiss, Susan Sterrett, and Michael Weisberg for helpful discussions and/or comments on 
earlier drafts; thanks also the participants of workshops in Madrid, Barcelona and Paris for 
their critical feedback. Finally I would like to acknowledge financial support from two project 
grants of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education (SB2005-0167 and HUM2005-
04369). 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
Bogen, James, and James  Woodward (1988), "Saving the phenomena", Philosophical Review 
97:303-352. 
Brown, James Robert (1999), Philosophy of mathematics. An introduction to the world of 
proofs and pictures. London: Routledge. 
Budd, Malcolm (1992), "Review of 'Mimesis as Make-Believe'", Mind 101:195-198. 
Cartwright, Nancy (1983), How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
——— (1999), The dappled world. A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cat, Jordi (2001), "On understanding: Maxwell on the Methods of illustration and scientific 
metaphor", Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 32 (3):295-441. 
 23 
Crittenden, Charles (1991), Unreality. The metaphysics of fictional objects. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press. 
Currie, Gregory (1990), The nature of fiction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
——— (2004), "Imagination and make-believe", in Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes 
(eds.), The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, London: Routledge, 355-346. 
Davies, David (2007), "Thought experiments and fictional narratives", Croatian Journal of 
Philosophy 7 (19):29-45. 
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro (1881), Mathematical psychics: An essay on the application of 
mathematics to the moral sciences. London: Kegan Paul. 
Elgin, Catherine Z. (1996), Considerate judgement. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Evans, Gareth (1982), The varieties of reference. Edited by John McDowell. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fine, Arthur (1993), "Fictionalism", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18:1-18. 
French, Steven, and James Ladyman (1997), "Reinflating the semantic approach", 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13:103-121. 
Friend, Stacie (2007), "Fictional Characters", Philosophy Compass 2 (2):141–156. 
Frigg, Roman (2003), Re-presenting scientific representation, PhD Thesis. London: 
University of London. 
——— (2006), "Scientific representation and the semantic view of theories", Theoria 55:49-
65. 
Giere, Ronald N. (1988), Explaining science. A cognitive approach. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2006), "The strategy of model-based science", Biology and Philosophy 
21:725-740. 
Hartmann, Stephan (1999), "Models and stories in hadron physics", in Mary Morgan and 
Margaret Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators. Perspectives on natural and social 
science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 326-346. 
Howell, Robert (1979), "Fictional objects: How they are and how they aren’t", Poetics 8:129-
177. 
Hughes, R. I. G. (1997), "Models and Representation", Philosophy of Science (Proceedings) 
64:325-336. 
Kivy, Peter (2006), Performance of reading: An essay in the philosophy of literature. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Lamarque, Peter (1991), "Essay review of 'Mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of 
the representational arts' by Kendall Walton", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
49 (2):161-166. 
Lamarque, Peter, and Stein Haugom Olsen (1994), Truth, fiction, and literature. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Lewis, David (1978), "Truth in fiction", in David Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers, Volume 
I, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983, 261-280. 
McCloskey, Donald N. (1990), "Storytelling in economics", in Christopher Nash (ed.), 
Narrartive in culture. The uses of Storytelling in the sciences, philosophy, and 
literature, London: Routledge, 5-22. 
Morgan, Mary (2001), "Models, stories and the economic world", Journal of Economic 
Methodology 8 (3):361-384. 
——— (2004), "Imagination and Imaging in Model Building", Philosophy of Science 71 
(4):753–766. 
Parsons, Terrence (1980), Nonexistent objects. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Russell, Bertrand (1919), Introduction to mathematical philosophy. London and New York 
Routledge 1993. 
 24 
Russell, Bertrand (1905), "On denoting", in, Logic and knowledge, London Routledge 1956, 
39-56. 
Shapiro, Stewart (1983), "Mathematics and Reality", Philosophy of Science 50:523-548. 
——— (1997), Philosophy of mathematics. Structure and ontology. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Smolin, Lee (2007), The trouble with physics: The rise of string theory, the fall of a science 
and what comes next. London: Allen Lane. 
Sugden, Robert (2000), "Credible worlds: The status of theoretical models in economics", 
Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (1):1–31. 
Suppes, Patrick (1960), "A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in mathematics 
and the empirical sciences", in Patrick  Suppes (ed.), Studies in the methodology and 
foundations of science. Selected papers from 1951 to 1969, Dordrecht Reidel 1969, 
10-23. 
Teller, Paul (2001), "Whither Constructive Empiricism", Philosophical Studies 106:123-150. 
Thomson-Jones, Martin (2007), "Missing systems and the face value practice", Synthese 
forthcoming. 
Vaihinger, Hans (1911), The philosophy of ‘as if’. English Translation London: Kegan Paul 
1924. 
van Fraasen, Bas C. (1997), "Structure and perspective: Philosophical perplexity and 
paradox", in Marisa L. Dalla Chiara (ed.), Logic and Scientific Methods, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 511-530. 
Volterra, Vito (1926), "Fluctuations in the abundance of a species considered 
mathematically", Nature 118:558-560. 
Walton, Kendal L. (1990), Mimesis as make-believe: On the foundations of the 
representational arts. Cambridge/MA: Harvard University Press. 
Weisberg, Michael (2007), "Who is a Modeler?" British Journal for Philosophy of Science 
58:207-233. 
Wigner, Eugene (1960), "The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural 
sciences", Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 13:1-14. 
Young, Hugh D., and Roger Freedman (2000), University physics. With modern physics. 10th 
ed. San Francisco and Reading (MA). 
 
 
